2007년 10월 31일 작성되고 2014년 12월 10일 공개된 외교 문서입니다.

문서 제목은 "청와대 행정관, 우리가 대선에서 패하겠지만 괜찮다"입니다.

(제목부터 충격적이죠? 대선에서 패해도 좋다고 말하는 청와대 행정관!!!)

청와대 정보원은 노무현 정부가 정동영 대통합민주신당 후보 지원에 별로 열의가 없다고 인정하였다.
대신에 노무현 지지자들은 무소속 문국현 후보를 위해 뛰고 있거나 유시민 전 보건복지부 장관의
2012년 선거 캠페인이 이미 시작되었다고 두 사람은 말하였다. 영남지방 노사모 조직의 회장이었던
현 청와대 행정관 김태환은 노무현 추종자들은 “모두 자기 갈 길을 갔다”며
누구도 자발적으로 정동영 캠프에 합류하지 않았다”고 말했다.

이명박이 당선되더라도, 이명박의 범죄 사실들을 이용해 언론과 야당이 그를 공격하면 4월 총선에서
승리할 수 있다는 기대에 부풀어 있다는 소리도 하네요. (참 한심하네요.)

호남을 도려내기 위해 상대 당과 손잡을 수도 있다는 이러한 발상 때문에
'열린우리당과 한나라당 대연정' 같은 충격적인 제안이 가능했던 것 아닐까요?


다음은 외교전문 원문입니다.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PINR [Intelligence], 
PREL [External Political Relations], KN [Korea (North)], KS [Korea (South)] 
SUBJECT: BLUE HOUSE ADVISORS: WE WILL LOSE IN DECEMBER BUT 
THAT'S OK 
 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On October 30, Poloffs met with two 
working-level Blue House policy advisers.  The two, both 
typical "Roh-sa-mo" supporters who owe their Blue House jobs 
to their work on the Roh campaign in 2002, were pessimistic 
about United New Democratic Party (UNDP) Candidate Chung 
Dong-young's chances in the December 19 presidential 
election, but were optimistic that the UNDP would be more 
successful in the April 2008 parliamentary elections.  They 
noted that they expected the extension of the South Korean 
troops to Iraq likely would pass without much difficulty 
despite the early rhetoric to the contrary.  Both also 
predicted that additional revelations about Lee Myung-bak's 
past would provide ample fodder for the UNDP and the press to 
attack once Lee took office.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
TEPID SUPPORT FOR UNDP CANDIDATE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Blue House contacts admitted that the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration had little enthusiasm for backing 
UNDP candidate Chung Dong-young.  Instead, they said Roh 
supporters were working for independent candidate Moon 
Kuk-hyun or had already started on former Health and Welfare 
Minister Rhyu Si Min's 2012 campaign.  Former head of the 
southeastern region Roh-sa-mo organization and current Blue 
House adviser Kim Tae-whan said the Roh followers had, "all 
gone every which way," and "no one voluntarily joined Chung's 
camp."  They sadly admitted the election of Lee Myung-bak, 
the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) candidate, was 
inevitable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
FURTHER ALLEGATIONS OF LEE'S PAST IMPROPRIETIES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (C) While hints of Lee's past improprieties including the 
BBK/Kim Kyung-joon scandal are being highlighted in the 
Korean media, the Blue House officials described the 
allegations as being "too little, too late" to seriously 
impact Lee Myung-bak's candidacy.  They predicted that, 
although the Korean public's support of Lee as a candidate 
was lukewarm, a misguided belief in the effectiveness of 
Lee's economic policies would ensure his election. 
 
¶4.  (C) The Blue House officials mentioned two confirmed 
accounts of Lee's past arrests or indictments: his 1964 
student arrest for protesting President Park Chung-hee's 
policies and his resignation from the National Assembly in 
1998 for violating election finance laws.  In addition, Kim 
Tae-whan claimed that there were a minimum of twelve 
additional instances of arrest or indictment yet to be 
revealed in the media.  When Lee registers as a presidential 
candidate on November 25 or 26, he must declare all past 
transgressions.  Again, this might not be enough to keep him 
from the Blue House, but it could give the media and the 
opposition ample reason to attack Lee from the day he is 
elected, which could help the UNDP salvage a victory in the 
April National Assembly election. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Blue House contacts speculated that Lee 
Hoi-chang, the GNP candidate who was defeated in the previous 
two presidential elections, might be mulling another run to 
hedge against the possibility that further allegations, 
especially those involving BBK, may derail Lee's candidacy. 
They dismissed Lee Hoi-chang as a serious threat to win since 
he was old and had already been discredited in his past 
defeats. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE 2008 PARLIMENTARY ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Blue House officials claimed the mainstream media 
may be reluctant to further investigate and divulge Lee's 
misdoings because of the potential impact on the upcoming 
election.  However, they were confident that as these 
allegations surfaced in the days following the election, a 
jaded Korean public would overwhelmingly elect UNDP 
candidates in the April 2008 parliamentary elections. 
Responding to questions of whether the UNDP could stay 
together until April, Jo Su-jeong, an assistant on the policy 
planning staff at the Blue House, said that the UNDP would 
stay together because if they do not, they would have lost 
control of both the Blue House and the National Assembly. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶7.  (C) Both Kim and Jo agreed the Iraq deployment would be 
extended.  While UNDP Candidate Chung and the party had come 
out strongly against the extension, a compromise had been 
reached so the extension could pass the Assembly.  They said 
the persuasiveness of Roh's speech -- apologizing for 
reneging on his promise to end the deployment by the end of 
2007 -- was the reason the extension had recently gained more 
support in the Assembly and in the public. 
 
VERSHBOW